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Scripture as a Source of Knowledge in Hinduism 
Anantanand Rambachan 
St Olaf College 
Most of us hear the word "scripture" 
without stumbling over it. Using it, we 
give the impression, even to ourselves 
that there is understanding of what th; 
term means; that we all know what 
scripture is. On reflection, it turns out 
that this is hardly the case. 1 
ONE OF WILFRED Cantwell Smith's 
principal concerns in What is SCripture? is 
to highlight the variety of texts which are 
construed as scripture and the variety of 
attitudes which human history reveals 
towards such texts. We may begin by 
noting, for example, the inappropriateness of 
the term "scripture" (from scribere - to 
write) for the Vedas because of its emphasis 
on the written word as opposed to the word 
which is heard and -preserved through oral 
transmission. The Vedas are more aptly 
referred to in Sanskrit as sruti (that which is 
heard) or sabda (sound), and these terms 
correctly underline the traditionally aural 
character of these texts.2 The Hindu 
tradition, especially in the Vedanta schools 
has relied on and elaborated the idea of srutt 
as a prarniir!-a (source of valid knowledge) 
and any unique features of this idea must be 
included in the "richness and depth with 
which human life has been imbued over long 
stretches of time for most human beings and 
societies, through their use of their 
involvement with their scripture".3 ' 
As indicated above, the doctrine of the 
sruti as a source of valid knowledge 
received particular attention in the Vedanta 
schools and my discussion of this doctrine is 
confined largely to its formulation in the 
Advaita (non-dual) tradition of Sailkara. I 
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will, however, make. some comparative 
references to Ramiinuja and the Visistiidvaita 
tradition where appropriate. Whii~ these 
theological giants of the Hindu tradition 
differ radically in their interpretation of the 
Vedas, they do share certain common 
assumptions about the nature of scripture as 
a source of valid knowledge. 
While there are important differences in 
the way in which the authority of sruti is 
conceived, the orthodox schools of Indian 
philosophy include it among the sources of 
valid knowledge and refer to it as sabda-
prarniir!-a.4 The term pramtL indicates valid 
cognitions arid the special source of such a 
cogriition is termed a pramiina. A pramiina, 
therefore, may be thought of as a source· or 
~ause of valid knowledge. In the words of 
Sailkara, "a means of knowledge is or is not 
such according as it leads or does not lead to 
valid knowledge. Otherwise even a post, for 
instance, would be considered a means of 
knowledge in perceiving sound, etc."5 . 
One of the very important consequences 
of understanding and listing the sTuti, along 
with perception and inference, etc., as a 
source of valid knowledge js that the sruti 
must satisfy, as far as possible, the criteria 
of being a prarniir!-a. Scripture cannot claim 
a special status which exempts it from being 
subject to the same standards as other 
sources. In the Advaita school, novelty and 
non-contradictedness are considered to be 
the essential characteristics of valid 
knowledge.6 Most of the emphasis, 
traditionally, has been placed on non-
contradictedness as the essential test of truth. 
An invalid statement or erroneous 
experience can be negated on the basis of 
being contradicted. 
4 
1
Rambachan: Scripture as a Source of Knowledge in Hinduism
Published by Digital Commons @ Butler University, 1996
Scripture as a Source of Knowledge in Hinduism 3 
The view of scripture in the Hindu 
tradition as a source of valid knowledge and 
the necessity to meet the standards of such 
knowledge require, it seems to me, that the 
defenders of the sruti recognize a continuous 
obligation to articulate, clarify, and defend 
its claims in dialogue with world views 
which either challenge or affirm its claims. 
An advocate of a sruti viewpoint cannot be 
indifferent to rival claims which are derived 
from the empirical sciences or other 
revelatory sources. A belief in the principle 
of non-contradictedness should engender an 
optimistic faith which is enthusiastic for 
dialogue with other insights about the 
ultimate nature of reality. Sruti-based 
positions provide an excellent perspective 
from which the Hindu tradition could 
vigorously engage both secular and sacred 
traditions in conversation. It is unfortunate , 
for reasons which I have tried to explore 
elsewhere, that a lack of interest in the sruti 
has also resulted in a loss of intellectual 
vigour in Hinduism and in a lukewarm 
desire for dialogue.7 One of the common 
claims of the contemporary Hindu 
apologetic; for example, is that its world 
view is "scientific", but we are yet to see, 
from within the Hindu tradition, a serious 
explication of its viewpoint in relation to the 
conclusions of the empirical pramiina. 8 
While admitting scripture as a source of 
valid knowledge, the Vedanta traditions also 
define the specific knowledge for which the 
sruti may be regarded as authoritative. The 
justification for a special means of 
knowledge, like scripture, is that it provides 
knowledge of those things which cannot be 
known through any of the other available 
sources of knowledge. For the Advaita 
tradition, the two subjects which are 
inaccessible to· all other pramanas and 
known exclusively through the Vedas are 
dharma and brahman.9 For Sailkara, the 
nature of dharma, which includes 
appropriate ethical as well as ritual action, is 
known only from the Vedas. 
The knowledge of one action being right 
and another wrong is based on scripture 
only; for it lies out of the recognizance 
of the senses, and there moreover is, in 
the case of right and wrong, an entire 
want of binding rules as to place, time 
and occasion. What in one place, at one 
time, on one occasion is performed as a 
right action, is a wrong action in 
another place, at another time, on 
another occasion; none therefore can 
know, without scripture, what is either 
right or wrong. 10 
The sruti, as we noted above, also 
serves as a valid source for our knowledge 
of brahman (the limitless) and it is in 
relation to the revelation of brahman that the 
Vedanta traditions articulate the most 
detailed rationale for the nature and 
necessity of the scripture as a pramana. The 
cornerstone of SaiIkara's argument for 
scripture as a valid means of knowledge for 
brahman is that given the nature of brahman 
as nirgul'}a (free from all qualities), a 
pramlll'}a which consists of words is the only 
logical means. Sound, sensation, form, taste, 
and scent are the respective spheres of the 
sense organs. Since brahman, however, has 
no sound, touch, form, taste, or smell, it is 
outside the domain of the sense organs. 
Moreover, argues SaiIkara, perceptual 
knowledge requires a process of objectifying 
the thing to be known, and brahman, being 
the eternal subject of all experiences,cannot 
be objectified. Although Ramanuja differs 
from SaiIkara in his understanding of the 
nature of brahman, it is significant to note 
that he refutes, in no uncertain terms, the 
possibility of knowing 'brahman through 
perception. 11 
Since· perception is an inappropriate 
means of knowledge for brahman, the view 
of both Sailkara and Ramanuja is that 
inference, which is more or less dependent 
on perception for its data, will not be 
helpful. Ramanuja sums up the basic 
Vedanta viewpoint. 
Thus the inference of a creative Lord-
which claims to be in agreement with 
observation is refuted by reasoning 
which is itself in agreement with 
observation, and we hence .conclude that 
2
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Scripture is the only source of 
knowledge with regard to a supreme 
soul that is the Lord of all and 
constitutes the highest Brahman. What 
SCripture tells us of is a being which 
comprehends within itself infinite, 
altogether unsurpassable excellences 
such as omnipotence and so on, is 
antagonistic to all evil, and totally 
different in character from whatever is 
cognised by other means of 
knowledge. 12 
Sruti fulfils the criteria of being a valid 
source of knowledge by generating a fruitful 
knowledge which cannot be obtained 
through another source and which is 
uncontradicted. 
Is or is not certain and fruitful 
knowledge generated by passages setting 
forth the nature of the Self, and if so, 
how can they lose their authority? Do 
you not see the result of knowledge in 
the removal of all the evils which are 
the root of transmigration, such as 
ignorance, grief, delusion and fear?13 
Since SaTIkara' s arguments for scripture 
as a source of valid knowledge are mainly 
epistemological (Le. that scripture fulfils the 
criteria of being a pramii'!a), it is important 
to. underline the point that the Advaita 
tradition does not try to establish the validity 
of the texts by reference to God's 
omniscience. The reason is that since the 
tradition finds it impossible to establish the 
existence and nature of God through 
inferential reasoning, one ends up with a 
hopelessly circular argument, "the 
omniscience of the Lord being established 
on the doctrine of Scripture, and the 
authority of Scripture again being 
established on the omniscience of the 
Lord" .14 
The admission of scripture as a source 
of valid knowledge in the Hindu tradition 
does not imply the redundancy of reason. 
While SaDkara and Ramanuja reject the 
argument that the nature of brahman may be 
ascertained through inferential reasoning 
independent of scripture, they are both 
supportive of the use of argument which is 
in harmony with revelation. Inferential 
reasoning independent of sruti is 
inconclusive since brahman possesses no 
perceptible characteristics.· Stimtinyato-
drstanumtina, however, which corresponds 
ih ·modern logic to analogical reasoning, is 
widely employed by Vedanta commentators. 
This type of reasoning is not viewed as a 
pramiina, but operates as an ancillary to a 
pramiina. Its function is to bolster the source 
of knowledge. Reason has to be used in 
ascertaining and clarifying the meaning of 
scripture in debates with schools that accept 
the authority of the sruti but offer different 
interpretations. It also has a wider role in 
defending scripture against rival schools 
which reject both its authority as a source of 
knowledge and its viewpoint. Riimanuja 
again sums up the Vedanta position. 
A theory which rests exclusively on 
arguments derived from human reason 
may, . at some time or place, be 
disestablished by arguments devised by 
people more skilful than you in 
reasoning; and thus there is no getting 
over the objection founded on the 
invalidity of all mere argumentation. 
The conClusion from all this is that with 
. regard to supersensuous matters, 
Scripture alone is authoritative,· and 
reasoning is to be applied only to· the 
support of SCripture. IS 
How does the proponent of the sruti 
respond when there is conflict between 
human experience and s~ripture? If the issue 
cannot be resolved by mutually acceptable 
forms of argument, the proponent will 
proffer the uniqueness of scripture as a 
means of knowledge. In the Vedtinta-Stltras, 
for example, the question of brahman 
creating the world without any organs of 
action is raised since one does not see beings 
without bodily organs creating anything. 
While noting that one should be cautious 
about generaliz~tions from experience, 
Sailkara falls back upon the authority of 
pramliTfa. 
The transcendent highest Brahman can I 
I 
I 
j 
~ 
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be fathomed by means of Scripture 
only, not by mere reasoning. Nor are 
we obliged to assume that the capacity 
of one being is exactly like that which is 
observed in another. I6 
One of the important features of the 
Vedanta characterization of scripture as a 
pramiif}a which may also open fruitful areas 
for dialogue with the Christian tradition is 
the concern to circumscribe the scripture's 
'sphere of authority. Commentators, like 
Sailkara, identify the subject matter for 
which scripture is a source of valid 
knowledge, but also the topics for which it 
does not speak authoritatively. In this sense, 
the srud is like all other pramiif}Qs in having 
a limited revelatory role. 
Scripture, as noted above, is intended 
for the revelation of dharma and brahman, 
both of which cannot be known through 
another source. Its purpose is not to disclose 
matters within the range of human 
experience, ascertainable through any of the 
other pramiif}Qs, like perception or 
inference. If a scriptural statement, 
therefore, contradicts an established fact of 
everyday human experience, the former 
cannot be considered authoritative since such 
a matter would be outside its sphere of 
authority. Sailkara is clear on this point. 
Sruti is an authority only in matters not 
perceived by means of ordinary 
instruments of knowledge such as 
pratyaksha or immediate perception;-
i.e., it is an authority as to the mutual 
relation of things as means to ends, but 
not in matters lying within the range of 
pratyaksha; indeed, sruti is intended as 
an authority only for knowing what lies 
beyond the range of human knowledge 
... A hundred srutis may declare that 
fire is cold or that it is dark; still they 
possess no authority in the matter. 17 
If sruti did describe fire as being cold or 
dark, we would be obliged to construe its 
meaning figuratively since the purpose of 
scripture is not to create anything anew or to 
reverse the nature of anything. The texts are 
fundamentally revelatory in purpose and are 
concerned with expressing things as they 
are. 
Things in the world are known to 
possess certain fixed characteristics such 
as grossness or fmeness. By citing them 
as examples the scripture seeks to tell 
us about some other thing which does 
not contradict them. They would not 
cite an example from life if they wanted 
to convey an idea of something 
contradictory to it. Even if they did, it 
would be to no purpose, for the 
example would be different from the 
thing to be explained. You cannot prove 
that fire is cold, or that the sun does not 
give heat, even by citing a hundred 
examples, for the facts would already 
be known to be otherwise through 
another means of knowledge. And one 
means of knowledge does not contradict 
. another, for it only tells us about those 
things that cannot be known by another 
means. Nor can scripture speak about 
an unknown thing without having 
recourse to conventional words and 
their meanings. 18 
The Advaita tradition is very specific 
about some of the topics which are. not 
authoritatively revealed in the scripture. It is 
not the purpose of scripture, for example, to 
inform us of the details and order of the 
creation of the world since we neither 
observe nor are told by the texts that the 
welfare of human beings depends on this 
. kind of knowledge. Such descriptions, 
argues Sailkara, really have as their aim the 
revelation of the nature 'of the absolute. 19 
It is also not the concern of scripture to 
describe the nature of the human being with 
regard to those characteristics which are 
available for observation. "The Lord, on tlie 
other hand, about whom ordinary experience 
tells us nothing, is to be c~:msidered as the 
special topic of all scriptural passages. "20 
The case for scripture as a means of 
knowledge in the Hindu tradition is based on 
the belief that there are realities (or a 
reality) whose true nature cannot be 
ascertained by other ways of knowing. Such 
a premise, it appears to me, is intellectually 
4
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defensible, especially when scripture is 
willing to subject its claims to assessment by 
other sources of knowledge and to question 
the conclusions of these sources. 
. The argument that each pramii"f!O- has a 
unique sphere of authority may appear to be 
one which inhibits dialogue among other 
religious traditions and between religion and 
the empirical sciences. It would seem to me, 
however, that the common interest which 
religions and the empirical sciences have in 
the nature of reality make them natural 
dialogue partners. If a religion understands 
the authoritative sources of other religious 
traditions as rival pramiinas, there is an 
obvious epistemological· necessity for 
dialogue to understand and explain their 
similar or dissimilar points of view. A 
similar case may be made for dialogue with 
the empirical sciences when the propositions 
of the latter converge with or stand opposed 
to religious claims. The assumption that 
valid sources of knowledge cannot contradict 
each other suggests that human inquiry, in. 
the widest sense, will some day converge, 
but in the meantime, the prarniif!.a approach 
urges us to account for our differences and 
similarities. The view of scripture as a 
pramii"f!O-, provides a sound basis for 
dialogue and holds out the possibility that all 
who are engaged in the quest for knowledge, 
in whatever diScipline, may be enriched by 
each other. 
Notes 
1. w.e. Smith, "What is Scripture?, 
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993, p. L 
2. A student of the Vedas is referred to, 
traditionally, as srotriya (one whohears). 
3. W.e. Smith, "What is Scripture?, p.16. 
While Smith argues for attentiveness to 
diversity in the materials which are regarded 
as sCripture and in their interpretation 
throughout history, there is no discussion in 
his work about the significant Hindu notion 
of the sruti as pramiina. The latter term does 
not occur in his discussion of the Hindu 
tradition. 
4. In this article 1 use the worlds sruti and 
sabda to refer to the Vedas. It must be~ 
recognized, however, that the term sruti as 
revelation is not limited to the Vedic texts. 
5. The Brhadarafiyaka Upanisad: with the 
comme~tary of Salikaracdrya, Swami 
Madhavananda (transl.), Calcutta: Advaita 
Ashrama, 1975, 11.1.20, p.214. Hereafter 
abbreviated BR.U.B. 
6. See e.g. The Vedanta Parib~a of 
Dharmaraja Adhvarfndra, Swami 
Madhavananda (transl.), Belur Math, 
Howrah: The Ramakrishna Mission 
Saradapitha, 1972, Ch.l, p.5. 
7. See Anantanand Rambachan, The Limits of 
Scripture: Vivekananda's Reinterpretation of 
the Authority of the Vedas, Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1994. 
8. This is also lamentable because of the 
significant number of people from the IIidian 
subcontinent who work in the fields of 
scientific and technological research. 
9. See, e.g., The Vedanta Sutras: with the 
commentary of Salikaracarya, George 
Thibaut (transl.), Sacred Books of the East 
Series, Vol. 34, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 
1988, 11.1.6. Hereafter abbreviated VSS. 
10. VSS, Vo1.38, III. 1.25. The existence of the 
self in future lives and the appropriate 
means for attaining happiness and avoiding f 
unhappiness in those lives fall within the 
sphere of dharma and are known only from 
the Vedas. 
1 L The Vedanta-Sutras: with the commentary of 
Ramtinuja, George Thibaut (transl.),Sacred 
Books of the East Series, Vol. 48, Delhi: 
Motilal Banarsidass, 1990, 1.1.3. Hereafter 
abbreviated VSR. While both SaIikara and 
Ramanuja see the words of Vedas as the 
authoritative source for the knowledge ofthe 
absolute, there is considerable dis.cussion on 
the problem of language relation to brahman 
and the special ways in which words are 
used in communicating valid knowledge of 
the limitless. This subject exceeds the scope 
of this article and the reader may want to 
consult Anantanand Rambachan, Accom-
plishing the Accomplished: The Vedas as a 
Source of Valid Knowledge inSafikara, 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991. 
See, in particular, Ch.3. 
12. Ibid. 
13. BR.U.B. I.iv.7. 
14. VSS 11.2.38. 
" 
--
5
Rambachan: Scripture as a Source of Knowledge in Hinduism
Published by Digital Commons @ Butler University, 1996
: 
, I 
: 
! 
I 
i 
Scripture as a Source of Knowledge in Hinduism 7 
15. VSR 11.1.12. 
16. VSS 11.1.31. On the same sutra RfunfulUja 
comments as follows: "That for which the 
sacred word is the only means of 
knowledge, and which is different from all 
other things, is capable of producing those 
effects also of the instrumental means of 
which it is destitute". See also their 
respective commentaries on surra 11.1.27. 
17. A. Mahadeva Sastry (trans!.), The 
Bhagavadgfta: with the commentary of 
Saflkaracarya, Madras: Samata Books, 
1977, 18:66. 
18. BR.U.B. 11.1.20. It is obvious that in the 
view of SaTIkara, the revelations of scripture 
are not opposed to fact. 
19. See VSS 1.4.14. 
20. Ibid., 1.3.7. 
6
Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies, Vol. 9 [1996], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol9/iss1/5
DOI: 10.7825/2164-6279.1127
